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Art and thought. Now there’s a brave title. Brave because it immediately conjures up an 
association with the heavy travail of “theory” or, more specifically, the dry, arid regions 
of a cognitive approach to art. Hence, the very title of this new anthology from Britain’s 
New Interventions in Art History series, Art and Thought, can provoke strong resistance. 
But maybe things are changing: after all we have experienced the long wave of theory, 
then the “discovery” of beauty (as if to imply no one had ever heard of this term before), 
so now perhaps it is fruitful to avoid these see-sawing oscillations and finally address the 
relation between art and thought. At least, this is what the editors of the Art and Thought 
anthology have in mind: their approach seeks to avoid entirely “antithetical methods” that 
split art from thought, whether it be theoretical approaches that ride roughshod over “a 
consideration of the aesthetic,”i or the more “traditional” methods of art history, “formal 
and iconographic analysis.” (8) The aim instead is to establish “the ways in which art 
‘thinks.’” (1) 
 
Art and Thought is a fascinatingly diverse and intricate collection that tackles one of the 
most difficult and perplexing issues within art history and aesthetics. It also presents 
immediate difficulties for a reviewer. First of all, its varied and detailed contributions do 
not cohere into a unified voice—this should not be unexpected, but many contributions 
are also, to a greater or lesser extent, contradictory. So one must treat this book as a broad 
and diverse attempt to tackle a crucial contemporary topic rather than, say, the definitive 
resolution of a fraught relation. Yet it is customary to think of the aesthetic in precisely 
these terms—that is, as presenting some harmonizing resolution or fundamental 
mediation. In fact, the editors declare that their “volume explores the aesthetic as a means 
of mediating the relationship between the senses and thought.” (8) 
 
While reinforcing this mediating role as pivotal to evading the antithetical formulations 
that plague art discourse, the editors proceed to suggest that “post-Kantian” formulations 
provide the impetus for investigating the best aspect of current disciplinary reflections 
within art history—and that is occurring “where the boundaries are opening up.” (1) The 
editors are then prompting us to follow this trajectory in order to think art and thought 
together, but a certain tension arises. Throughout this volume, mediation, in one form or 
another, is frequently (but not universally) assumed to be one of the leading attributes of 
aesthetic reflection. The best of current art-historical reflection, by contrast, pivots 
between a discipline and an outside, which suggests a certain tension between what is 
knowable, perhaps even familiar, and something yet to be dealt with or assimilated. 
Further complicating this scenario, the aesthetic may also be understood as suggesting 
that the unfamiliar may lurk within these established and familiar disciplinary boundaries. 
This is a counter-theme that runs throughout many of the essays (see the contributions of 
Puttfarken, Potts, Pollock, Melville, Costello and Rifkin, which all deal with the 
unfamiliarity or unexpected quality of art) and this emphasis sits uneasily with the 
presumption of aesthetic as forging a harmonious mediation. 
 
Of course, this does not rule out “mediation” entirely, but it does force a rethink of how it 
is traditionally aligned. One way of grasping this relation is to consider art or the 
aesthetic in general as signaling something contrary or conflicted. Take the very practical 
problem I am faced with: the dilemma of how to present all this diverse material 
adequately. This dilemma is akin to the aesthetic problematic insofar as it asks, how does 
one pay adequate attention to specificity of each individual contribution, while doing 
justice to this breadth of engagement and thus giving some credible sense of coherence or 
unity to another reader? The treatment of such issues really depends upon how one 
regards the role of art and the aesthetic: that is, as one of exemplary mediation or 
something more ambiguous—as Adrian Rifkin puts it, with recourse to Lacan, art viewed 
in terms of “unfixity, ambivalence or unavailability.” (199) These contrasting aesthetic 
conceptions constitute the key fault lines, I would suggest, that run throughout this new 
anthology and appear decisive to many of its deliberations. 
 
These orientations each presume very different roles for critical analysis. I will call one 
of the most familiar modes, the “rendezvous” model of criticism: in this case, the art-
historical analysis presumes an alignment between the critical interpretation and an 
original, sometimes more obtuse and sophisticated understanding of the artist or the 
artwork, an understanding which has been previously submerged or not yet fully 
comprehended (that is, until the arrival of the dazzling new interpretation). It is 
frequently the case that this model of interpretation is determined by a governing 
aesthetic presumption, which in the “rendezvous” case tends to stress a circuit of 
plenitude, autonomy or self-sufficiency. (Often this is implied negatively by suggestions 
that thought, theory and interpretation violate the work).ii 
 
In Jay Bernstein’s intriguing analysis, Pieter de Hooch’s scenes of ordinary life, in 
particular his domestic scenes from 1658 onward, are viewed as offering an alternative to 
the Enlightenment model offered by Descartes, which, Bernstein objects, evacuates the 
sensory world. (31) The force of the argument is to assert that de Hooch was able to 
offer—“for the first and only time” (47)—an embodied world, which rendered “the 
sensible world of everyday experience …as self-sufficient and complete.” (32) In short, 
de Hooch, with his “realist materialism,” presents an alternative schema to mathematical 
abstraction (Descartes, Italian Renaissance painting as well as science). For this reason, 
Bernstein feels Flemish painting’s great art-historical advocate, Svetlana Alpers, gets it 
wrong when she aligns such art with the breakthroughs of an erroneous observational 
science. (36-9) Instead, following Bernstein, once we realize what de Hooch achieves—
and when we do, we realize that “there can be no doubt about what we are perceiving” 
(45)—then we realize that de Hooch is making a claim about a “self-sufficient secular 
world,” (42) “a wholly sensible world of touch and sight that was sufficient in itself.” 
Finite beings find their place in a finite world; this is the lesson we grasp from de Hooch. 
Bernstein asks—though by this point we should “know” the answer—whether “human 
artifacts—houses, alley-ways, sheds, patios—ever seemed so self-contained and world-
making, composing so complete a human world—as in de Hooch’s scenes of autonomous 
domestic Delft life?” (47)  
 
Well, of course, by this point the answer is obvious, but that answer can only be correct if 
we exclude from the list of “human artifacts” provided by Bernstein things like scientific 
instruments, namely microscopes and telescopes, for to include them would mean, 
Bernstein implies, following Alpers down a dead end that inevitably leads to an inhuman 
world forever exiled from the sensible world. The goal of critical analysis is implicit here, 
but it presupposes its aesthetic equivalent: the goal of the reading is to demonstrate a 
synthesis or, to use Bernstein’s favourite term, a “self-sufficiency,” wrapped up in a 
teleological framework that matches Bernstein’s undoubtedly fascinating analysis to a 
buried content that now has been unearthed. Yet for all this subtlety the impression one 
comes away with is of a haunted model for aesthetics and art: this an art “for the first and 
only time,” and thus it serves as a redundant example in considering the current viability 
of art and aesthetics. Hence, we glimpse s a model of art lost today, except as this 
haunted possibility. Or is it a projection? How do we gauge its limits as a reading when 
what is external to its self-sufficiency is already excluded (the technological intrusion)? If 
art thinks, as this volume asks us to presume it does, and if art is also presumed to be 
self-sufficient and complete, then any interpretative analysis must always amount to a 
violation of this more pristine, more thinking entity. And here’s the rub, such a 
formulation establishes a dichotomy again; we’re forced to deal with art and thought as 
either a harmonious immersion in the self-sufficient example or a perpetual diminishment 
of that example by means of the violent and clumsy intrusion of interpretative “thought” 
(the technological intrusion matched by the discursive intrusion in terms of their capacity 
to spoil things). 
 
Interestingly, Michael Podro cites Kant’s explanation of the difference between intuition 
and understanding, perceptual and conceptual cognition in the next essay. This time the 
telescope plays its part in helping Kant with an analogy: The Milky Way presents itself to 
the naked eye as “a white band,” though through a telescope “I see the individual stars.” 
(57) The very tension opened by Bernstein’s exclusion of a telescope from a homely, 
self-sufficient world of human artifacts and Kant’s exploration of this prosthetic 
extension makes for an interesting point of exploration within aesthetics. It is not an issue 
taken up with any great relish in Art and Thought, except perhaps in Alex Pott’s 
discussion of Merleau-Ponty in regard to museums and slides, but more clearly and 
explicitly in Diarmuid Costello’s essay on Heidegger and Tate Modern. This haunted 
possibility of de Hooch is a little like Heidegger’s Greek temple, a relic, perhaps a 
projection to the extent that this “world” is deemed coherent to a degree that we seem 
incapable of projecting onto art in any equivalent way today. As models of art and 
aesthetics, they stand as non-possibilities for us today. Hence, Diarmuid Costello, in his 
essay on Heidegger and Tate Modern, strives to make Heidegger work against himself in 
our contemporary situation in order to contemplate “a technological work of art.” This 
does not debunk Heidegger entirely, nor is it intended to, as Costello freely admits, but it 
does offer the possibility of thinking about a “work” that “does not merely reproduce its 
age but, like Heidegger’s own examples, unleashes a resistant potential within it.” (191) 
This is an exemplary engagement, but one must ask what makes Tate Modern a “work” 
in this recast Heideggerian mode? Is it its curatorial program? The building itself? Or the 
resistant works within Tate Modern that never quite conform to the inert, ahistorical 
purposes that are required of them? If it is the latter case, then this might be true of all 
challenging and resistant work, whether it is exhibited in Tate Modern or elsewhere.iii 
 
What this might imply is that modern and contemporary art might not furnish a “world” 
in the sense that Bernstein suggests de Hooch made available or Heidegger with the 
Greek temple (albeit not forgetting, as Costello reminds us, how this is complicated in 
Heidegger by his emphasis on strife and self-concealing). This might force an equally 
rigorous recasting of certain cherished aesthetic models because this emphasis upon 
making and forging a connection to a world is emphasized many times throughout the Art 
and Thought volume. No one less than Picasso himself remarked, in the aftermath of the 
challenges of collage (synthetic Cubism), that the art rested upon the presumption that the 
world “was not exactly reassuring” and that such a displacement of objects within collage 
underlined how art sought to accentuate this strangeness.iv Picasso is a good example of 
the ill-fit between a traditional aesthetic vocabulary and this dawning awareness of new 
imperatives that might not match up well together, for he was apt to resort to the most 
conventional aesthetic justifications whenever it suited him. 
 
Art and Thought contains many instances of very instructive engagements that grapple 
with forging a rethink of certain basic aesthetic tenets. I take Stephen Melville’s analysis 
of “postminimalism” as a good example—particularly his conclusion in which he takes 
“postminimalism” to be understood as “the moment of the modernist work’s becoming 
explicitly responsible not simply for its medium but for what in that medium both divides 
and exceeds it, opening it to displacement.” (170) Melville’s challenge is—through 
recourse to Hegel as well as Robert Smithson—to pose the challenges of minimalism and 
its aftermath in terms of sculpture rather than painting (through sculpture, art comes 
closest to “actual autonomy and objectivity as sculpture”). Painting, by contrast, “fully 
acknowledges that the world escapes it.” For Melville, painting amounts to a retreat from 
sculpture, meaning from the three-dimensional to “a two-dimensional practice predicated 
upon absence” and so we understand the course of modernist painting: “painting’s 
primacy is the moment of art’s finitude and its turning toward its dissolution as 
philosophy, painting’s primacy is itself limited.” (169) But if we turn back to the example 
of collage, it is apparent that Picasso’s explanation reinforces what Melville says about 
how the world escapes painting—though we should qualify it and say that it also 
indicates the ways in which the world escapes us in general—but what are we to say 
about the Russians, the constructivists, who tended to interpret collage as a spatial 
challenge? What can we say about these histories that denote dislocation and disruptions 
within our received patterns of what constitutes modernism? Melville refers to the pivotal 
importance of paying due heed to these dislocations in order to “reconsider some of the 
rough patches in our received narratives.” (163) Also, along this tack, we might consider 
how Smithson sought not just the “necessity” of the work, but a glacial time, the 
geological and the industrial overlaying one another, denoting entropy rather than simple 
succession. This might mitigate the Hegelian tone, so we might qualify the philosophical 
comprehension in order to suggest, with Melville, that, yes, art must indeed “prove itself 
in and as its dispersion” and that for a work to sustain itself, displacement will mean 
“being responsible for its appearance always in and as a working of the system” (of the 
arts), as well as within a relation binding sculpture to painting—but with the qualification 
that this responsibility within such a system also means that art does not yet know itself 
what it will be. (169)  
 
What this all suggests is that the aesthetic model assumed by a reading often seems to 
have a determinate bearing upon how the relation between art and thought is assumed to 
operate. The idea that art furnishes a world gives way to recognition of a different 
function today—to repeat Picasso, a not very reassuring model of a relation, so that we 
see different emphases arising in this volume—displacement with Melville; a resistant 
potential with Costello; artworks as “coherent deformations” with Potts, never yielding “a 
defineable meaning” (108); or, with Griselda Pollock citing Ettinger, artists as 
introducing “all kinds of Trojan horses from the margins of their consciousness; in that 
the limits of the Symbolic are transgressed all the time by art.” (135) In most cases, this is 
an issue of content—that is, what the critical analysis itself is discussing, whether it be an 
artwork, a theory of art or an artist’s practice. What I believe Kant’s abiding question 
related to, in regard to aesthetic judgment, was the presentation itself, whether it is 
between art and thought, or an analysis that presents an art that somehow evades 
conventional discourse. The paradox is that evasion needs to be presented as clearly as 
possible in order to communicate. Hence, Kant’s abiding issue concerns adequacy. 
 
When it comes to an exemplary mediation in regard to the aesthetic, one cannot go past 
Kant. It is an odd quirk of history that Kant often is disparaged because of Clement 
Greenberg and his perceived reductive formalist criticism in the mid-twentieth century 
(or Roger Fry before him).v In his analysis, Michael Podro says that for Kant it was a 
redundant exercise to ponder “what lay outside the scope of our knowledge.” “The only 
world we could talk about intelligibly was one which appeared in our experience.” (54) 
Art appears in our experience, but this begs the question of whether the aesthetic is 
always intelligible within our framework of knowledge? Otherwise, if it were, then we 
could reasonably expect what will follow as a consequence of what has occurred in the 
past. As we have seen, the most fraught debates in art arise when art does not follow a 
recognized pattern—and that holds true for critics, such as Greenberg, as much as it does 
for artists. Podro makes clear why this seemingly more indeterminate realm is important 
for Kant: “to reside within our cognitive conceptualizing judgments is to experience the 
world as determinate.” (65) (In making this point, Podro raises a point that is endorsed 
many times in other essays, i.e., Cavell on modern art (Vickery), Pollock’s paper, 
Costello on Heidegger). Yet this crucial point may spell difficulties for Podro’s ensuing 
emphasis upon an attunement between “ourselves and the world”—“we become aware of 
a certain reciprocity between the external object and our own projecting or imagining.” 
(65) Our attunement may continually be challenged by an object we never adequately 
determine. And we need to figure this as an issue for any critical practice that aims to 
deal with this fraught relation between art and thought. I may not have done justice to 
Podro’s examination, but, as I understand Kant, the aesthetic registers this attunement as 
an issue of decision, of where and how to forge emphases, and so I have sought to show 
the fault lines that trigger the debates in this exemplary volume. In reading this book, one 
gains a good sense of the many, varied modes of that attunement available today.  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
i The chief methodological culprits named are Marxist sociological models, with their 
recent derivation in the “analysis of visual culture,” and cultural studies readings, 
particularly those of a psychoanalytic bent. (8) All page references to the Art and 
Thought volume appear in brackets. 
ii For a good example in this volume, see Jonathan Vickery’s explication of Fried and 
Cavell: “One of the paradoxes of minimal art is that, despite its apparent meaningless it 
has prompted a considerable quantity of “theory” or speculative criticism. For Cavell, if 
we have to supply an explanation or a theory for the artwork to become intelligible, then 
either it, or we, have failed.” (119) If that is the case, and if description is more apt as 
Cavell argues, then there is no case for an essay like Vickery’s, which attempts to explain 
Cavell and Fried on modern art in their own terms, because we could only benefit from 
reading their descriptions of art, not an essay explaining their theories of modern art. 
Vickery’s essay is worth reading though, but that means not taking Cavell or Fried at 
their own word at times. For instance, Vickery argues that both eschew any a priori 
determinates for art, yet shape for Fried, as Vickery presents it, is surely the nearest 
possible equivalent (a point reinforced by the terms of Fried’s own appraisals of Joseph 
Marioni’s painting in the late 1990s). 
iii Costello also makes the suggestive remark that Tate Modern’s monumental quality 
hints at an “impending obsolescence” in the manner of the grand railway stations being 
built as cars went into mass-production for the first time. Will we be able to say that 
video killed the monumental art museum? 
iv Cited in Marjorie Perloff, The Futurist Moment: Avant-Garde, Avant Guerre, and the 
Language of Rupture, (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 1986), 44. 
v Amelia Jones notes that American “modernist formalism” “oversimplified” Kant. Still 
that does not stop her from chastising Kant nonetheless: the modernist formalist supports 
his claim, she goes on to say, by recourse to “what Kant termed a disinterested judgment, 
one untainted by sensual appreciations or bodily desires.” (79) Jones’s triumphant tone 
often over-determines her arguments and the differences she wishes to instantiate. Thus, 
her reading of Merleau-Ponty appears rather one-dimensional, and hectoring, alongside 
Alex Potts’s study which directly follows. Although, he characterizes Kant much the 
same way, I prefer Melville’s imperative to attend to “the rough patches in our received 
narratives.” (163) Rather than triumphant overcoming and quick dismissals, much of the 
best critical work today takes in these less heroic sounding zones. 
